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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 11-3579 
_____________ 
 
PEDRO REYES, 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
MARK DILUZIO 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Civ. Action No. 5-10-cv-03102) 
Magistrate Judge: Honorable Henry S. Perkin 
______________ 
 
Submitted: June 7, 2012 
______________ 
 
Before: SCIRICA, GREENAWAY, JR., and COWEN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: September 7, 2012) 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
Pedro Reyes (“Reyes”) appeals the September 21, 2011 Order of the District 
Court, granting summary judgment in favor of appellee Police Detective Mark DiLuzio 
(“DiLuzio”) of the Bethlehem Police Department.  Reyes was initially arrested and 
charged with suspicion of DUI and driving with an open container of alcohol.  The DUI 
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charges were later dropped, and he was charged only with driving with an open container 
of alcohol.  Reyes filed suit against DiLuzio seeking damages for false arrest and 
malicious prosecution.  Reyes also sought punitive damages.  The District Court granted 
summary judgment in favor of DiLuzio.  For the reasons stated below, we shall affirm the 
District Court’s Order. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we recount only the 
essential facts.  On July 6, 2008, Reyes was stopped at a sobriety checkpoint in 
Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, while returning home from a party.  Officer Doug Nothstein, 
the contact officer at the checkpoint, was responsible for making first contact with drivers 
and making observations regarding their sobriety.  Officer Nothstein stated that he saw an 
open container of beer in Reyes’s car and also noticed that Reyes had glassy, bloodshot 
eyes and sluggish movements.  He also detected an odor of alcohol on Reyes’s breath.  
Officer Nothstein also asserted that Reyes admitted that he had been drinking earlier that 
night at a party.  
Officer Nothstein asked Reyes to step out of the car and directed him to Appellee, 
DiLuzio1
                                                 
1 DiLuzio’s responsibilities at the checkpoint were to conduct field sobriety testing on 
those drivers removed from their vehicles on suspicion of DUI. 
.  Officer Nothstein briefed DiLuzio on his observations regarding Reyes.  After 
noticing that there was an open container of beer in the car and making similar 
observations about Reyes’s eyes and the odor on his breath, DiLuzio decided to 
administer a preliminary breath test (“PBT”) and two field sobriety tests.  DiLuzio took 
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two PBT readings, which came back at .09 and .10, both above the legal limit of .08 for 
alcohol levels in the bloodstream while driving.  DiLuzio administered the field sobriety 
tests—the one-legged-stance and the walk-and-turn test.  Reyes failed both field sobriety 
tests.   
Based on the results of the field sobriety tests, Reyes was taken into custody on 
suspicion of DUI.  He was transported to the Northampton County DUI Center.  Officer 
Eric Schaedel, an employee of the DUI Center, observed that Reyes had a “moderate” 
level of alcohol on his breath, mumbled when he spoke, had “bloodshot” eyes and was 
“unsteady” in his gait.  With Reyes’s consent, blood was drawn and sent to a local 
hospital for testing.  The results were negative for alcohol content.   
As a result of the DUI Center blood test, DiLuzio did not pursue DUI charges 
against Reyes.  Instead, DiLuzio mailed Reyes a summary traffic citation for driving with 
an open container of alcohol in his car, in violation of 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3809.  At the 
hearing on the open container charge, a magisterial district judge found Reyes not guilty 
of the traffic violation, but guilty of the open container violation.  
Reyes subsequently filed a civil rights action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
against DiLuzio, claiming that DiLuzio arrested him without probable cause, in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.  Specifically, Reyes 
contends that he was arrested for drunk driving without probable cause, and that his claim 
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was supported by the fact that a blood test done shortly after the arrest was completely 
negative for alcohol.2
DiLuzio filed a motion for summary judgment.  The District Court granted the 
motion since Reyes had not put forth any evidence to contradict the testimony of 
DiLuzio, Officer Nothstein, or Officer Schaedel.  Reyes filed a timely appeal. 
   
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1291 to review the District Court=s grant of summary 
judgment.  Busch v. Marple Newtown Sch. Dist., 567 F.3d 89, 95 n.7 (3d Cir. 2009).  We 
review the District Court’s order granting summary judgment de novo.  Azur v. Chase 
Bank, USA, Nat’l Ass’n, 601 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2010).  To that end, we are required 
to apply the same test the district court should have utilized initially.  Chambers ex rel. 
Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 181 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting 
Oritani Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md.
III. ANALYSIS 
, 989 F.2d 635, 637 (3d Cir. 
1993)). 
 
Reyes contends that his DUI arrest occurred despite the absence of probable cause 
and that the District Court erred in crediting DiLuzio’s testimony regarding Reyes’s 
alleged drunken state.   
 
                                                 
2 Reyes contends that either DiLuzio was not truthful in his testimony regarding the PBTs 
or there was some error with the blood test results from the local hospital. 
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Reyes contends that the blood test administered at the DUI Center correctly 
showed that he had no alcohol in his system, even though DiLuzio testified that Reyes 
failed the field sobriety tests and the PBT.  He argues that the individuals involved in 
testing his alcohol blood level at the DUI Center were deposed and testified as to the 
chain of custody and the procedures used; and concluded that there could have been no 
mistake with the sample.  In addition, Reyes argues that evidence of his demeanor and his 
ability to walk and speak clearly are apparent on a video and sound recording.  However, 
that recording was not in the record; thus, the District Court could not consider that 
evidence.  Any consideration of this evidence on appeal is beyond our purview.  
Lack of Probable Cause for Arrest 
Reyes also argues that DiLuzio violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment 
when he was arrested, handcuffed, placed in a police car, and taken to the County DUI 
Center, from which he was not free to leave.  According to Reyes, these acts constituted 
“a custodial arrest and a seizure.”  (Appellant’s Br. at 22.)  
We have held that “the test for an arrest without probable cause is an objective 
one, based on the facts available to the officer at the moment of arrest.”  Barna v. City of 
Perth Amboy, 42 F.3d 809, 819 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 
(1964)).  “Probable cause to arrest exists where the facts and circumstances within [an 
officer’s] knowledge and of which [that officer] had reasonably trustworthy information 
[are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an 
offense has been or is being committed.”  Edwards v. Phila., 860 F.2d 568, 572 (3d Cir. 
1988) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949)).  Therefore, as 
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long as the officers had some reasonable basis to believe that Reyes had committed a 
crime, the arrest is justified as being based on probable cause.  Here, DiLuzio had 
probable cause to arrest Reyes, based on the information provided by Officer Nothstein at 
the DUI checkpoint.  More important, DiLuzio had his own observations and the results 
of the tests he had administered in the field.  There was no error on this basis. 
Reyes contends that his arrest, based on its resolution, amounts to malicious 
prosecution.  In order to prevail on a claim for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must 
show: (1) the defendant initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding 
ended in plaintiff’s favor; (3) the proceeding was initiated without probable cause; (4) the 
defendant acted maliciously or for a purpose other than with the concept of seizure as a 
consequence of a legal proceeding.  
Malicious Prosecution 
Johnson v. Knorr
If probable cause is established, a malicious prosecution claim fails as a matter of 
law.   
, 477 F.3d 75, 82 (3d Cir. 2007).  
These elements are conjunctive. 
See Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 195 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[H]ad the District Court 
analyzed Kossler’s claims under the third element of malicious prosecution, it would 
have found that the existence of probable cause precluded his action from proceeding.”)  
Because we find that DiLuzio had probable cause to arrest Reyes, a claim for malicious 
prosecution cannot proceed.3
                                                 
3 Reyes fails to discuss punitive damages in his brief.  The issue is waived.  “It is well 
settled that an appellant’s failure to identify or argue an issue in his opening brief 
constitutes waiver of that issue on appeal.”  United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 
(3d Cir. 2005).   
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Reyes contends that the District Court erred in crediting DiLuzio’s “disputed” 
testimony in entering summary judgment in DiLuzio’s favor.  He argues that the Court 
based its entry of summary judgment on the fact that “[DiLuzio] observed him smelling 
drunk, acting drunk, and testing legally drunk on an unverifiable PBT, all of which are 
disputed facts, which the factfinder is not required to believe, and which [he] has 
introduced substantial evidence to contradict.”  (Appellant’s Br. at 18.)  Reyes also 
argues that DiLuzio is not truthfully reporting his observations made at the checkpoint, 
and that there is both direct and circumstantial evidence to suggest that Reyes was not 
exhibiting any signs of intoxication, negating the existence of probable cause to arrest.  
(
DiLuzio’s Testimony 
Id.
Reyes also argues that Officer Schaedel’s observations regarding his condition 
should not have been considered by the District Court when making its determination 
regarding summary judgment, as he was never deposed and did not submit an affidavit.   
Although the District Court listed a number of factors in considering whether to grant 
DiLuzio’s motion for summary judgment, Officer Schaedel’s observations were not listed 
among the factors.  
 at 12.)  Reyes has failed to raise genuine disputes as to material facts sufficient to 
reverse the District Court on this issue. 
See
Reyes bases his contention regarding the veracity of DiLuzio’s testimony on the 
results of the DUI Center blood test.  He claims that DiLuzio’s testimony should not have 
been believed on summary judgment.  Reyes contends that he has made “an ample 
 App. at 10a. 
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showing” of evidence for a reasonable jury to find in his favor, based on his arguments 
challenging the veracity of DiLuzio’s testimony.  (Id.
Two retorts are prompted by this argument.  First, the District Court’s role on 
summary judgment is not to determine credibility.  Thus Reyes’s assertion regarding 
DiLuzio’s testimony is not relevant to our de novo review of the District Court’s 
summary judgment ruling.  Second, the basis for summary judgment does not center on 
DiLuzio’s testimony.  There is also the testimony of Officer Nothstein, the results of the 
field sobriety tests, the reported smell of alcohol on Reyes’s breath, Reyes’s admitted 
alcohol consumption that evening, and the open container of alcohol.  These facts were 
appropriately considered in determining whether genuine disputes of material fact 
required denial of summary judgment.   
 at 21.)   
We find that Reyes has not provided sufficient facts for the District Court’s 
consideration to suggest that genuine disputes of material facts exist which would negate 
the grant of summary judgment.  Reyes’s general disagreement with the evidence and 
testimony presented against him are not enough to produce a different outcome.   
IV. 
For the reasons set forth above, we shall affirm the Order of the District Court.    
CONCLUSION 
